On the other end, there is an excessive use of 2FA with systems for whom the concept of SSO seems to be a foreign thing. It’s also sort of funny that 2FA can just mean using a TOTP capable password manager, reverting it back to one factor.
It’s not actually reduced to one factor, just a single point of failure. If their password manager gets taken it’s a problem, however the generated TOTP is worthless in 1 min. So this will protect the login from cases where the password is known like a compromised website or a reused password.
If the site is compromised, then the hackers could have stolen the TOTP secrets as well as the passwords. How do you think the site verifies TOTP codes? If you reuse passwords while using a password manager, you are asking for it, though.
A full hack of every part of the service is not the only way a user’s password could get known to an attacker. Could be MiTM, could be typo-squatted, etc
If a site is that compromised no measure of auth is gonna help, so little use worrying about it.
A lot of the technology you use to connect over VPNs or over the Internet already addresses MitM. If it’s typo-squatted, you are sort of using password managers wrong. You do have the option of setting up TOTP elsewhere like on your phone authenticator so the point of failure isn’t on your side, I just think it’s sort of funny how easily you can make it be one.
That depends on the manager. Good ones won’t have access to your stuff outside of an encrypted blob. Still, it’s generally better to use a separate authenticator.
That makes it a single point of failure yes, and the rest of the comment you’re replying to goes into detail on what it does protect from even if both passwd and TOTP are in the password manager
Sorry i misunderstood what you were saying. I thought you were saying that if the password manager was compromised then the attackers would have only 1 minute to make use of the tokens before they change.
Not if your TOTP codes are generated by another device, then the attacker needs your password, plus the device holding the key for TOTP. If you use it on your phone and authenticator is your phone then a theif has everything when they steal your phone.
Hardware key for TOTP is a better 2FA method as its totally separate from your PC or phone
As long as the default recommendation is to use authenticator apps on your main device I’ll see this as a “could be good if implemented correctly, which it isn’t, so it isn’t good”
I mean yes everything is hackable.
Thankfully the hardware key supports FIDO where there is a public / private pair with private locked on the hardware. Not enough services support this though.
So threat is being targeted and having somebody steal the hardware key.
On the other end, there is an excessive use of 2FA with systems for whom the concept of SSO seems to be a foreign thing. It’s also sort of funny that 2FA can just mean using a TOTP capable password manager, reverting it back to one factor.
It’s not actually reduced to one factor, just a single point of failure. If their password manager gets taken it’s a problem, however the generated TOTP is worthless in 1 min. So this will protect the login from cases where the password is known like a compromised website or a reused password.
If the site is compromised, then the hackers could have stolen the TOTP secrets as well as the passwords. How do you think the site verifies TOTP codes? If you reuse passwords while using a password manager, you are asking for it, though.
A full hack of every part of the service is not the only way a user’s password could get known to an attacker. Could be MiTM, could be typo-squatted, etc
If a site is that compromised no measure of auth is gonna help, so little use worrying about it.
A lot of the technology you use to connect over VPNs or over the Internet already addresses MitM. If it’s typo-squatted, you are sort of using password managers wrong. You do have the option of setting up TOTP elsewhere like on your phone authenticator so the point of failure isn’t on your side, I just think it’s sort of funny how easily you can make it be one.
But if a password manager is compromised then doesn’t the attacker also get the TOTP key which is what generates the codes in the first place?
It wouldn’t matter if it expires in one minute because they’ll have the token to generate the next code, as well as now knowing the password.
That depends on the manager. Good ones won’t have access to your stuff outside of an encrypted blob. Still, it’s generally better to use a separate authenticator.
That makes it a single point of failure yes, and the rest of the comment you’re replying to goes into detail on what it does protect from even if both passwd and TOTP are in the password manager
Sorry i misunderstood what you were saying. I thought you were saying that if the password manager was compromised then the attackers would have only 1 minute to make use of the tokens before they change.
This. This so much. Password+Totp based login is just two passwords where one is more annoying to use.
Not if your TOTP codes are generated by another device, then the attacker needs your password, plus the device holding the key for TOTP. If you use it on your phone and authenticator is your phone then a theif has everything when they steal your phone.
Hardware key for TOTP is a better 2FA method as its totally separate from your PC or phone
As long as the default recommendation is to use authenticator apps on your main device I’ll see this as a “could be good if implemented correctly, which it isn’t, so it isn’t good”
If you can get at a password by hacking a website, I wouldn’t be holding out hope that they couldn’t then steal the TOTP secret.
I mean yes everything is hackable. Thankfully the hardware key supports FIDO where there is a public / private pair with private locked on the hardware. Not enough services support this though.
So threat is being targeted and having somebody steal the hardware key.